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Comment
Is There Consortium Before Birth? Expanding
the Availability of Loss of Society Damages
in Wrongful Death Actions
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, a decedent's next of kin
can recover damages for pecuniary injuries resulting from the dece-
dent's death.' In recent decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court has
held that pecuniary injuries2 encompass loss of society damages3
and has expanded the categories of next of kin entitled to recover
these damages.4 In 1982, the court held that pecuniary injuries
recoverable under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act included loss of
consortium of a spouse.' Subsequent decisions expanded previ-
ously unavailable loss of society damages to wrongful death actions
arising from the parent-child relationship. 6 Recently the court re-
solved conflicts among the lower courts and expanded the potential
liability of tortfeasors by holding that loss of society damages are
available to parents of a stillborn viable fetus' and to siblings of a
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 1-2.2 (1991).
2. Although not defined in the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, pecuniary injuries have
been defined elsewhere:
Within [the] meaning of [a] wrongful death statute . . . [the] term "pecuniary
injury" means a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits from the contin-
ued life of the deceased.... Such compensation includes damages for depriva-
tion of support, of companionship, guidance, advice, love, and affection of
deceased.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1131 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
3. These damages are described to some Illinois juries as follows:
Damages-Loss of Society-Definition
When I use the term "society" in these instructions, I mean the mutual bene-
fits that each family member receives from the other's continued existence, in-
cluding love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, guidance, and
protection.
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) No. 31.11 (3d ed. 1992).
4. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
5. Elliott v. Willis, 442 N.E.2d 163 (Ill. 1982).
6. See Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 499 N.E.2d 1373 (11. 1986) (loss of a minor
child); Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 1984) (loss of an adult child).
7. Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1991).
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decedent.'
This Comment will review both the wrongful death action and
loss of society damages as they have evolved under Illinois statu-
tory and case law. The Comment will then discuss the recent Illi-
nois Supreme Court decisions resolving conflicts over the damages
that may be recovered in wrongful death actions based on the loss
of a stillborn viable fetus or a sibling. It will analyze these deci-
sions in order to determine whether they are reasonable extensions
of the law. Finally, the Comment will suggest an approach for
dealing with the siblings of an unborn decedent and the parents of
a stillborn nonviable fetus, including principles to consider in ex-
tending the availability of loss of society damages and in determin-
ing the nature of the losses encompassed by these damages.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Wrongful Death Action in Illinois
Under English common law, a civil action for wrongful death
did not exist, and dependents and heirs of a decedent could not
recover for their losses arising from a victim's death.9 The harsh
consequences of this principle eventually led Parliament to adopt a
wrongful death statute, commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act,
in 1846.10 Since then, all jurisdictions in the United States have
enacted wrongful death statutes.' Early English courts construed
Lord Campbell's Act narrowly, providing compensation only for
the survivors' pecuniary losses, and excluding recovery for intangi-
ble losses such as loss of society and mental anguish. 12 Wrongful
death statutes in many states, including Illinois, adopted "pecuni-
ary" loss as the measure by which juries award damages.' 3
8. In re Estate of Finley, 601 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. 1992).
9. The rule precluding a civil action for wrongful death was initially stated in the
English case of Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Q.B. 1808).
10. Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents 1846, 9 & 10
Vict., ch. 93 (Eng.).
11. For an enumeration of these statutes, see MARILYN MINZER ET AL., 4 DAMAGES
IN TORT AcTiONs 29 (1992).
The statutes vary with regard to the methods of calculating damages and to whom the
cause of action belongs (decedent's next of kin or estate), but their purpose is to compen-
sate the decedent's next of kin for their losses. For an overview of the history of the
wrongful death action, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 125A-127 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
12. See, e.g., Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852).
13. The Illinois Wrongful Death Act provides:
Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal repre-
sentatives of such deceased person, and, except as otherwise hereinafter pro-
vided, the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive
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Under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, the personal representa-
tive of the decedent may bring a wrongful death action for the ben-
efit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of the decedent to
recover damages for their pecuniary injuries resulting from the vic-
tim's death. 4 The Act does not define pecuniary injuries, although
the construction of the phrase at the time the Act was adopted
included the lost income and services of the decedent.1 5  Courts
have defined next of kin as those blood relatives of the decedent
who would have taken his or her property if the decedent had died
intestate. 16 In the absence of a spouse or descendants, next of kin
includes parents and siblings.17
Early Illinois courts recognized a presumption of pecuniary loss
when the next of kin were lineal heirs.1 8 This presumption applied
to the death of a child because child labor was prevalent at the
time; thus, a child was an economic asset to his or her family.' 9 In
creating this presumption, courts acknowledged that pecuniary
loss might be difficult to quantify and shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant to show the absence of damages.2°
Historically, this presumption of pecuniary injury did not en-
compass loss of society damages, which plaintiffs could not recover
under the Act.21 Some wrongful death statutes, however, specifi-
benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person and in
every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and
just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such
death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2 (1991).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 1-2.2 (1991).
15. See Adrienne Lehrbaum-Weiss, Bullard v. Barnes-Parental Recovery for Lost
Society and Companionship of a Minor Child Under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 34
DEPAUL L. REV. 803, 807-11 (1985) [hereinafter Lehrbaum-Weiss] (describing how
early Illinois courts adopted the narrow English construction of damages available under
the Wrongful Death Act).
16. See In re Estate of Finley, 601 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Il. 1992); see also ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 2-1 (1991) (Probate Act of 1975-Rules of descent and
distribution).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 2-1(d) (1991).
18. This would include the parent-child relationship. See Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R., 349 N.E.2d 413, 417 (Ill. 1976) (stating that a presumption of pecuniary loss ap-
plies to lineal next of kin of the deceased in a wrongful death action brought by the
parents of decedent children).
19. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Mich. 1960) (discussing factors
that now keep children out of the labor market).
20. For a discussion of the history of the presumption, see Lehrbaum-Weiss, supra
note 15, at 811-13.
21. Trotter v. Moore, 447 N.E.2d 1340, 1344 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1983) (holding
that a jury may not consider loss of a deceased child's society as a pecuniary injury under
the Wrongful Death Act).
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cally allow recovery of damages for loss of society.22 The Illinois
legislature has had several opportunities to amend the Act to pro-
vide for such recovery but has failed to do so. 23 Therefore, neither
the language of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act nor its legislative
history mandates that loss of society damages be available to plain-
tiffs as pecuniary injuries.24
B. Loss of Society Damages in Illinois
The loss of consortium (loss of society) action originated in the
right of a master to recover for injuries sustained by his servant,
since in addition to the servant's actual injuries, the master had
also sustained a loss of his servant's services .2  Since the law his-
torically considered a wife to be her husband's servant or property,
courts extended this doctrine to the marital relationship and al-
lowed a husband to bring an action to recover for losses resulting
from injuries to his wife. 26 Loss of consortium damages in this set-
ting include loss of sexual attentions, society, and affection.27 This
22. John F. Wagner, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Loss of Consortium Re-
sulting from Death of Child-Modern Status, 77 A.L.R. 4TH 411, 416-17 (1990) [herein-
after Wagner].
23. See 1 LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1982 SESSION OF THE 82ND
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at 697 (Legislative Reference Bureau, February 11, 1983); 1 FI-
NAL LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1981 SESSION OF THE 82ND GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, at 974 (Legislative Reference Bureau, December 18, 1981); 2 FINAL LEGIS-
LATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1980 SESSION OF THE 81ST GENERAL ASSEM-
BLY, at 1863 (Legislative Reference Bureau, February 19, 1981); 2 FINAL LEGISLATIVE
SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1979 SESSION OF THE 81ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at
1544-45 (Legislative Reference Bureau, January 14, 1980). All of these sources reflect
attempts to amend the Wrongful Death Act to provide the right to recover for the loss of
society of the deceased as well as for pecuniary injuries.
24. One commentator has criticized extending the availability of loss of society dam-
ages beyond the marital relationship as being inconsistent with legislative intent. See
Thomas S. Orr, Wrongful Death in Illinois: A Statute Comes of Age, 62 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 75, 86-87 (1985) [hereinafter Orr]. However, court decisions construing these dam-
ages as pecuniary injuries have not elicited a legislative response. See Ballweg v. City of
Springfield, 499 N.E.2d 1373, 1379 (Ill. 1986) (loss of society of an adult child); Bullard
v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (Ill. 1984) (loss of society of a minor child); Cooper v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 505 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987) (loss of
society of a parent).
25. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 125, at 931.
26. Taking a more appropriate view of the status of women, the majority of jurisdic-
tions now also allow a woman to seek loss of consortium damages for injuries sustained
by her husband. Id. § 125, at 931-32; see also Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (Ill.
1960) (awarding loss of consortium damages to the wife of a fireman who sustained severe
bums).
27. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 125, at 931. Illinois courts allow recov-
ery of loss of society damages for nonfatal injuries to another only when the plaintiff is a
spouse in a valid marital relationship. See Medley v. Strong, 558 N.E.2d 244 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1990). In Medley, a woman was not allowed to recover loss of consortium
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is a derivative action that compensates one party for losses that he
or she has sustained as a result of injuries to another person.2"
In 1982, in Elliott v. Willis, 29 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that loss of society damages were available to spouses as pecuniary
injuries under the Wrongful Death Act. The court noted that prior
courts had permitted children to recover for the loss of their de-
ceased father's care, guidance, attention, instruction, training, and
advice.30
In 1984, in Bullard v. Barnes,a" the court extended this line of
reasoning. The Bullard court held that parents could recover loss
of society damages for the death of a minor child as pecuniary inju-
ries under the Wrongful Death Act.32 The court recognized that in
current society the benefits that parents derive from children are
intangible rather than financial. 3 As such, the court replaced the
presumption of pecuniary loss of the child's earnings with a pre-
sumption of pecuniary loss of the child's society.3 4
damages from a physician whose alleged negligent management of her boyfriend's uro-
logic problem resulted in penile amputation. Id. at 246. The couple had lived together
for 10 years and represented themselves as married but were not legally married. Id. at
245; see also Sostock v. Reiss, 415 N.E.2d 1094, 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980) (hold-
ing that husband may not recover loss of consortium damages from the date of his subse-
quent marriage for injuries sustained by his wife during their engagement).
28. See Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equip. Co., 572 N.E.2d 920, 925-26 (Ill.
1991) (finding that under comparative negligence principles, recovery for loss of consor-
tium is limited by the physically injured spouse's negligence).
29. 442 N.E.2d 163, 170 (Ill. 1982) (permitting a wife whose husband died in a motor
vehicle accident to recover damages for loss of consortium as a pecuniary injury under
the Illinois Wrongful Death Act).
30. Id. at 167; see also Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 133 N.E.2d 288, 295 (Ill.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 937 (1956) (holding that pecuniary injuries can include loss of a
father's care, attention, instruction, training, advice, and guidance).
31. 468 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 1984). In Bullard, the parents of a 17-year-old driver who
was killed trying to avoid an oncoming truck sued for wrongful death, seeking loss of
society damages. Id. at 1230. For a discussion of the law of various states on this topic,
see Wagner, supra note 22.
32. Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1233. The court noted but refused to decide whether its
holding also applied to actions based on the death of a child who had reached the age of
majority. Id. at 1234. However, in 1986 it extended a presumption of loss of society
damages to this setting. Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 499 N.E.2d 1373 (Ill. 1986).
33. Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1234. The court also noted that this precluded parents
from recovering the costs of rearing a healthy child in a "wrongful birth" action. Id.; see
Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. 1983) (denying recovery of child-rearing
costs in a wrongful birth action because the benefit of life outweighs the expense of sup-
porting it). Contra University of Ariz. v. Superior Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 1301 (Ariz. 1983)
(allowing recovery of child-rearing costs in a wrongful birth action but deducting the
benefits of the child's society from the costs of raising it).
34. Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1234. The court also allowed child-rearing costs to be
deducted from loss of society damages in determining an appropriate award. Id. at 1235.
One author has argued that this is of little practical significance. See Charles E. Schmidt,
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The Bullard court believed that its decision was a logical exten-
sion of Elliott, making damages which were considered pecuniary
losses under Elliott available to another category of plaintiffs enti-
tled to recover under the Act.3 5 However, Bullard also departed
from Elliott by allowing damages to a next of kin who could not
recover for similar but nonfatal injuries in a derivative tort
action. 36
Following Bullard, courts considered whether loss of society
damages were available to other categories of next of kin entitled to
recover under the Wrongful Death Act.37 Courts agreed that in
wrongful death actions, children losing a parent were entitled to a
presumption of loss of society. s Until recently, however, the Illi-
nois courts disagreed about whether loss of society damages were
available to parents losing an unborn child39 or to siblings of a
decedent4 °
Recovery for Loss of Society and Companionship in Wrongful Death and Personal Injury
Actions, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 319, 324 (1989) [hereinafter Schmidt] ("As a practical matter,
rare is the case that a defendant's attorney would want to alienate a jury by arguing about
how much money the defendant has saved the grieving parents by causing the death of
their child.").
35. Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1233.
36. The court noted this discrepancy in Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ill.
1988). In Dralle, the court denied loss of society damages to parents of a child whose
severe, but nonfatal birth defects were allegedly due to the use of Bendectin during preg-
nancy. Id. at 210. The court reconciled this decision with Bullard by noting that the
victim of nonfatal injuries still retains a cause of action against the tortfeasor:
The chief distinction between the claim for loss of society in a wrongful death
action and its assertion here is that the nonfatally injured victim retains his own
cause of action against the tortfeasor. Thus, there is no danger that the injury
caused by the tortfeasor will go uncompensated, or that similar conduct in the
future will be undeterred. In contrast, an action under the Wrongful Death Act
affords the sole remedy for the surviving family members.
Id. at 212.
37. See Schmidt, supra note 34, at 334 (discussing situations in which such claims
may be asserted).
38. See Jackson v. Pellerano, 569 N.E.2d 167, 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991);
Adams v. Turner, 555 N.E.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990); Cooper v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 505 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
39. Compare Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1987) (recov-
ery denied) with Smith v. Mercy Hosp. and Medical Ctr., 560 N.E.2d 1164 (Ill. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1990) (recovery allowed).
40. Compare Moss v. Whitaker, 573 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991), appeal
allowed, 580 N.E.2d 118 (Ill. 1991) (no recovery allowed) and Carter v. Chicago & Ill.
Midland Ry., 522 N.E.2d 856 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1988) (no recovery allowed) with
Schmall v. Village of Addison, 525 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988) (recovery
allowed) and Singh v. Air Ill., Inc., 520 N.E.2d 852 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988) (recov-
ery allowed) and Sheahan v. Northeast Ill. Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 496 N.E.2d
1179 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986) (recovery allowed).
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C. Recovery For the Wrongful Death of an Unborn Child41
In 1973, the Illinois Supreme Court held for the first time that
for the purposes of the wrongful death statute, a viable fetus 42 was
a person.43 As a result, the next of kin could recover for injuries
sustained by a viable fetus if it was stillborn. 44 The legislature
eliminated any viability requirement in 1980,45 thus providing a
cause of action for a death or injury occurring at any time after
conception. The Illinois Supreme Court further extended the pos-
sibility for plaintiffs to recover when it held that there is a pre-
sumption of pecuniary damages in wrongful death actions based on
the loss of a viable fetus.46
Following this rapid expansion of plaintiffs' recovery options,
lower courts disagreed over whether pecuniary injuries included
loss of society in a wrongful death action based on the death of a
stillborn child.47 For example, the Illinois Court of Appeals for the
Fifth District refused to award damages in this setting,48 while the
Court of Appeals for the First District found loss of society dam-
ages to be appropriate.49
41. For a recent review of prenatal torts, see Michael P. McCready, Note, Recovery
for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 391 (1991).
42. A viable fetus is one whose state of development renders it capable of independent
existence outside its mother's womb. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed.
1990).
43. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1973) (holding that parents
of a fetus whose injuries resulted in its stillbirth could recover in a wrongful death action
if the fetus was viable at the time of the injury).
44. Id. at 91.
45. The 1980 amendment provides:
The state of gestation or development of a human being when an injury is
caused, when an injury takes effect, or at death, shall not foreclose maintenance
of any cause of action under the law of this State arising from the death of a
human being caused by wrongful act, neglect or default.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2.2 (1991).
46. Jones v. Karraker, 457 N.E.2d 23, 25 (Ill. 1983). Here, the presumption was
found sufficient to sustain an award of $125,000 when the only evidence presented on the
question of damages was the fact that the fetus was viable and that absent the alleged
malpractice, the plaintiff would have had a healthy child. Id. at 29 (Simon, J., dissent-
ing). The court did not address whether pecuniary damages included loss of society.
47. See supra note 39. Both the Hunt and Smith courts acknowledged that pecuniary
injuries could include loss of society, and that a cause of action existed for the wrongful
death of a fetus. Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1987);
Smith v. Mercy Hosp. and Medical Ctr., 560 N.E.2d 1164, 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1990). However, the courts differed in their analysis of whether case law and the
amended wrongful death statute required that these damages be available in a wrongful
death action in this setting. See Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1326; Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1169.
48. Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1326-27.
49. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1173.
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In Hunt v. Chettri,50 the plaintiffs alleged that an obstetrician's
negligence had resulted in the stillbirth of their child. The trial
court dismissed the portion of the complaint requesting loss of so-
ciety damages.5 1 On appeal, the court rejected the parents' argu-
ment for extending the presumption of these damages to the loss of
a stillborn.5 2 Although both the Wrongful Death Act5" and prior
decisions 54 provided for a wrongful death action based on the death
of a viable fetus, the court decided that neither the Act nor the
decisions delineated the bases for awarding damages. 55
The Hunt court noted that Bullard created a presumption of loss
of society damages that could "be rebutted by presenting evidence
that a parent and child were estranged."56 Without a tangible rela-
tionship, the court reasoned, it would be impossible to demonstrate
estrangement.5 7 Moreover, the court believed that an existing rela-
tionship was implicit in the rationale of the Illinois Supreme Court
in presuming loss of society damages for minor and adult chil-
dren. 58 The court concluded that to allow these damages when no
society had ever been exchanged would confuse recovery for loss of
society with recovery for the parents' grief.5 9 Since bereavement
and mental anguish are distinguishable from loss of society, with
only the latter constituting pecuniary injuries,6° the appellate court
upheld the dismissal of the count seeking recovery of loss of society
damages.61
The Hunt court also noted the anomaly of allowing recovery to
parents of a child dying immediately after birth but denying it to
parents of a stillborn child when the apparent losses are nearly
identical.62 Reasoning that the parents' loss is determined by the
"length, intensity, and quality of the parent-child relationship," the
court took note of the "bonding" that takes place at birth.63 As a
result, the court held that birth is the proper point at which courts
50. 510 N.E.2d at 1325.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1326.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 1-2.2 (1991).
54. Jones v. Karraker, 457 N.E.2d 23 (Il1. 1983); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg,
304 N.E.2d 88 (Il1. 1973).
55. Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1326.
56. Id. (citing Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1234).
57. Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1326.
58. Id.; see also supra notes 31-34.
59. Id.
60. See Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1233; Elliott, 442 N.E.2d at 167.
61. Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1326-27.
62. Id. at 1326.
63. Id.
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should begin to measure the loss of a child's society."
The issue of whether parents may recover loss of society dam-
ages for the loss of their stillborn child was also considered in
Smith v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center,65 a wrongful death
action in which the plaintiffs alleged that their obstetrician's negli-
gence resulted in the stillbirth of an otherwise viable fetus in its
third trimester. 66 Following Hunt, the trial court struck the por-
tion of the complaint seeking loss of society damages.67 On appeal,
the First District rejected Hunt, concluding that a presumption of
loss of society damages exists in a wrongful death action based on
the loss of a viable fetus.68
Unlike the Hunt court, which found no guidelines in the Wrong-
ful Death Act for determining the nature of available damages, the
Smith court believed that the Act wed a right to a recovery. 69 By
amending the Act, the court reasoned, the legislature had intended
to place parents of a stillborn in just as favorable a position as those
of a liveborn.7 ° The court agreed with the Hunt court that the
Illinois Supreme Court had created the presumption of pecuniary
injuries for the wrongful death of a viable fetus at a time when
damages did not include loss of society for the death of a child.7' It
noted, however, that in Elliott the supreme court had already rec-
ognized loss of society as a pecuniary injury in a spousal wrongful
death action and that the Bullard court cited this holding in ex-
tending the presumption of loss of society damages to the parent-
child relationship. 72 Rejecting the significance that the Hunt court
placed on the initial parent-child bonding at birth, the Smith court
64. Id.
65. 560 N.E.2d 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990). In 1987, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois considered the issue in Denham v. Bur-
lington N. R.R. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Applying Illinois law in the
absence of contrary authority, the court considered the holding of Hunt dispositive in
granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. Denham, 699 F. Supp. at
1256.
66. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1165.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1173.
69. Id. at 1169.
70. Id. ; see also supra note 45. This result is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the
legislature considered but did not enact legislation that would have expanded damages
under the Wrongful Death Act to include loss of society. See supra note 23. Addition-
ally, had the fetal injuries been nonfatal, the parents would not have been able to recover
for loss of society. See supra note 36.
71. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1168.
72. Id. at 1169. The court also found support in the fact that Bullard had cited an
Idaho case allowing a presumption of loss of society damages for the wrongful death of a
viable fetus. Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982). Differences in the wording of
1993]
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found it illogical to permit recovery for a death occurring immedi-
ately after birth but not for one occurring immediately before
birth, when proof of damages would be similar in both settings.13
The Smith court also perceived the nature of loss of society dam-
ages differently from the Hunt court. The Hunt court concen-
trated on the nature of the existing relationship, concluding that
society must be exchanged to be lost.74 In Smith, the plaintiffs
were willing to introduce testimony that the maternal-fetal rela-
tionship consisted of more than mere tissue pressure.75 However,
this type of testimony may not have been necessary, since the
Smith court perceived the Wrongful Death Act as permitting com-
pensation for future loss and not only for the destruction of an
existing relationship.76
Addressing the Hunt court's concern that a defendant could not
rebut the presumption of these damages, the Smith court offered
several suggestions. 77 These included presenting evidence of inevi-
tably fatal congenital infirmities,7 s intent of the mother to abort the
fetus 79 or place the child for adoption,"° or abandonment of the
wrongful death statutes, coupled with different judicial constructions, make comparisons
across jurisdictions difficult. See Orr, supra note 24, at 83-84.
Volk, a wrongful death action for the loss of a viable fetus, was based on an Idaho
statute allowing recovery of damages "as under all the circumstances of the case as may
be just." IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1979). Idaho courts had construed loss of society dam-
ages as being recoverable under this statute. Volk, 651 P.2d at 14. However, the Idaho
court also noted that punitive damages may properly be awarded in Idaho, id., which is
not the case in Illinois. See Howe v. Clark Equip. Co., 432 N.E.2d 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 1982).
In Bullard, the reference to Volk occurs in a string cite of cases from jurisdictions
allowing "parental recovery in a wrongful death action for the loss of society of a child."
Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1232. No mention is made of the fact that the death occurred
before birth.
73. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1170; see also Villamil v. Elmhurst Memorial Hosp., 529
N.E.2d 1181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 922 (Ill. 1989)
(permitting a presumption of loss of society when a child was killed in a delivery room
fall immediately after birth).
74. Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1326.
75. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1170.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1171-72.
78. See Flynn v. Vancil, 242 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ill. 1968) (using evidence that an in-
fant suffered from severe congenital anomalies to rebut the presumption of pecuniary
injuries and to sustain an award of no damages).
79. See Light v. Proctor Community Hosp., 538 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d
Dist. 1989). This case was a medical malpractice action in which a pregnant woman
underwent an abortion after a radiologist negligently exposed her to radiation. Id. at 829.
The court rejected the mother's wrongful death action, holding that the abortion, rather
than the radiation exposure, was the cause of death, with the former being excluded
under the Act. Id. at 830; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2.2 (1991) (excluding
lawful abortions done with consent from the Wrongful Death Act).
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family by the parent claiming injury.8 The court believed that
with proper instructions, a jury could distinguish loss of society
damages from impermissible damages for mental bereavement . 2
Finally, the First District also followed Bullard by rejecting a pre-
sumption of loss of the unborn child's services but, instead, al-
lowing plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their loss. 83
D. Recovery for the Wrongful Death of a Sibling
The first Illinois court to consider whether loss of society dam-
ages could be awarded to a sibling was the Court of Appeals for the
First District in Prendergast v. Cox. 4 Prendergast was a wrongful
death action arising from the death of a thirty-eight-year-old bach-
elor in a car accident.8 5 At trial, the court had refused a jury in-
struction allowing loss of society as an element of his siblings'
damages.8 6 The appellate court affirmed, noting the distinction be-
tween lineal and collateral heirs. 7 The court found that the former
may rely on a presumption of substantial pecuniary damages but
that the latter are entitled only to provable damages.88 In declining
to extend Bullard's presumption of loss of society damages to sib-
lings of the decedent, the court noted that the Bullard court had
been cautious in declining to consider whether its holding would
apply to a child who had attained majority.89
Two years after Prendergast, in Sheahan v. Northeast Illinois Re-
gional Commuter Railroad,90 the court reconsidered its ruling. In
Sheahan, siblings of a decedent killed in a railroad-crossing acci-
dent appealed dismissal of their claim for loss of society damages.91
There, the court found that siblings are entitled to recover for
proven loss of society.92 The court distinguished Prendergast by
noting that in that case the issue had not been the dismissal of a
complaint but the failure to give the jury a specific instruction. 93
80. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1172.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1173-74.
84. 470 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984).
85. Id. at 35.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 37.
88. Id.
89. Prendergast, 470 N.E.2d at 37; see also Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1234
(Ill. 1984) (limiting its holding to minor children).
90. 496 N.E.2d 1179 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986).
91. Id. at 1180.
92. Id. at 1182.
93. Id. at 1181. Since collateral siblings are not entitled to a presumption of dam-
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Since siblings are entitled to proven pecuniary damages, the court
found that the plaintiffs could recover for loss of society if they
could prove such a loss. 94
In Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railroad,9  the Fourth
District disagreed with the First District, holding that loss of soci-
ety damages were unavailable to siblings of a decedent killed in a
railroad-crossing accident. Noting that Bullard had been cautious
in extending the availability of loss of society damages, the Carter
court saw no public policy reason to expand damages to this set-
ting, since loss of society damages are difficult to calculate and do
not alleviate the burden of the injury. 96
When it made loss of society damages available as pecuniary in-
juries in wrongful death actions based on the spousal and parent-
child relationships in Elliott and Bullard, the Illinois Supreme
Court provided little direction to lower courts on how to apply
these decisions to wrongful death actions based on other relation-
ships. By reserving the option to make these decisions, the court
took a conservative approach that would require the court to re-
visit the issue when conflicts developed between the lower courts.
III. DISCUSSION
By ruling that loss of society damages are available to the par-
ents of a stillborn viable fetus and to the siblings of a decedent, the
Illinois Supreme Court continued its previous approach of consid-
ering the nature of the particular relationship and deciding
whether it would be equitable to allow loss of society damages in
ages, the refusal of the instruction could have been based on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. Id.
94. Id. at 1182; see also Singh v. Air Ill., 520 N.E.2d 852 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1988). In Singh, the plaintiff's sibling died in an airplane crash. Singh, 520 N.E.2d at
855. The defendant appealed a $400,000 jury verdict because the jury had been in-
structed that it could consider proven loss of society. Id. at 857. The court held that the
evidence presented was sufficient to allow the instruction. Id. at 858; see also Schmall v.
Village of Addison, 525 N.E.2d 258 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1988). In Schmall, the court
agreed with Sheahan and allowed siblings to recover proven loss of society damages.
Schmall, 525 N.E.2d at 265. Rejecting concerns that Bullard's conservative approach
indicated an intent not to expand the availability of these damages, the court noted the
subsequent extension of its holding to adult children. Id. The court also noted that Bul-
lard dealt with presumed rather than proven damages and reasoned that it would not be
inconsistent to permit siblings to recover proven damages. Id.
95. 522 N.E.2d 856, 861 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1988).
96. Id. When asked to reconsider Carter in light of contrary decisions in other dis-
tricts, the Fourth District reaffirmed in Moss v. Whitaker, 573 N.E.2d 333, 335 (I11. App.
Ct. 4th Dist.), appeal allowed, 580 N.E.2d 118 (I11. 1991), noting that the line between the
appellate court districts was clearly drawn.
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each setting. Conspicuously absent was a pronouncement that loss
of society constitutes a pecuniary injury in all wrongful death
actions.
A. Seef v. Sutkus:9' Allowing Parental Recovery of Loss of
Society Damages for the Wrongful Death of a Stillborn
Fetus
In 1991, the Illinois Supreme Court resolved the dispute between
lower courts over whether loss of society damages should be avail-
able for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. 98 In Seef v. Sutkus,99
the plaintiffs alleged that the failure of their obstetrician and hospi-
tal personnel to monitor their fetus and to perform a timely
cesarean section resulted in the stillbirth of an otherwise viable fe-
tus. Relying on Hunt, the trial court dismissed portions of the
complaint seeking recovery for loss of society.' °0 The Illinois
Court of Appeals for the First District reversed the dismissal of the
loss of society claim, focusing on the existing rather than on the
future parent-child relationship.°10 Although it acknowledged that
the existence of a relationship between the parents and their un-
born child might be difficult to prove, the First District was not
willing to concede that no society existed as a matter of law."0 2
Rejecting Hunt's contention that it would be impossible to show
estrangement in this setting, the appellate court suggested that a
defendant could introduce evidence showing that the mother had
endangered the fetus by abusing alcohol or drugs or by otherwise
neglecting her own health. 103 Characterizing the nature of the pre-
natal mother-child relationship as an "unproven factual question,"
the First District refused to decide the issue as a matter of law
97. 583 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1991).
98. Id.
99. 562 N.E.2d 606, 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990), aff'd, 583 N.E.2d 510 (Ill.
1991).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 612-13; see also infra note 103. The Seef court took a somewhat different
approach in reaching the same conclusion as the intervening decision in Smith. See, 562
N.E.2d at 610. Although it found Smith's holding to be more in accord with the amended
Act, the court acknowledged that Illinois law did not fully delineate the bases for award-
ing damages for the wrongful death of a stillborn. Id. This conformed with Hunt's
perception of the law, Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1326, rather than with Smith's, which had
found that the Act wed a right to a remedy, placing the parents of liveborn and stillborn
children on equal footing. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1169.
102. Seef, 562 N.E.2d at 612.
103. Id. at 611. Unlike the examples in Smith, these examples involve maternal be-
havior occurring during the existing maternal-fetal relationship rather than the future
parent-child relationship. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to present evidence. I
The defendants appealed, and the supreme court granted leave to
appeal solely on the issue of whether there could be recovery for
loss of society of a stillborn child.105
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the Wrongful
Death Act allows parents of a stillborn to recover damages for pe-
cuniary injuries resulting from its death.' °6 The court felt that it
would be illogical to allow recovery of loss of society damages for
the death of a newborn but to deny it for the death of a nearly full-
term stillborn. 07 The court also held that a rebuttable presump-
tion of loss of society damages exists in this setting. 0 8
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Miller considered the con-
flicting decisions of the lower courts. 0 9 He argued that although
the Illinois Supreme Court had recognized loss of society as a pe-
cuniary injury, it did not follow that loss of society was an element
of the damages for which compensation need always be allowed in
a wrongful death action." 0
Chief Justice Miller next considered the nature of loss of society
damages and rejected the Hunt court's contention that society
must be exchanged before it can be lost."' Rather, since compen-
sation includes future loss, recovery of loss of society damages need
104. Seef, 562 N.E.2d at 612. The court also considered the inequities that could
arise by drawing a line at birth, noting that a child born alive at seven months would
actually be physically less mature than an eight-month-old stillborn. Id. Citing the
often-quoted example of viable unborn twins who suffer the same prenatal injury, where
one dies before and the other after birth, Chrisafogeorgis, 304 N.E.2d at 91 (quoting
Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959)), the court felt that it
would be inequitable to allow parents to recover for one but not the other. Seef, 562
N.E.2d at 612.
105. Seef v. Sutkus, 567 N.E.2d 342 (Ill. 1991).
106. Seefv. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510, 511 (Ill. 1991).
107. Id. at 512.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 512 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
110. Id. (Miller, C.J., concurring). In arriving at this conclusion, he considered the
approach that the Illinois Supreme Court had taken in recognizing loss of society as a
pecuniary injury in various settings. Id. For example, were such damages always recov-
erable, it would have been unnecessary after Elliott to decide the issues presented in Bul-
lard and Ballweg or the issue subsequently decided in Finley. Id. at 512-13.
111. Chief Justice Miller stated:
Contrary to Hunt, the parents' right to recovery for loss of society does not
depend upon whether there has been an exchange of society in the past....
Rather, it depends upon whether but for defendant's negligence society would
have been exchanged.... [T]hat there may have been no society in the past is
irrelevant; it is the loss into the future which is compensable.
Seef, 583 N.E.2d at 513 (Miller, C.J., concurring) (citing Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1170-71).
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not depend on an existing relationship.'1 2 The length, intensity,
and quality of the existing relationship would instead relate to the
amount of damages and not to the right to recover.' 1 3
Chief Justice Miller observed that the difficulties in ascertaining
loss of society damages would be similar whether the death oc-
curred immediately before or immediately after birth. Thus, he
agreed with the majority that it would be inappropriate to deny
recovery because of the timing of the defendant's wrongful act. 14
Although the nature of such damages would not be susceptible to
the same in-depth analysis and calculation as other damages, Chief
Justice Miller concluded that a jury would be capable of assigning
a monetary value to loss of society damages.' 15
B. In re Estate of Finley:" 6 Siblings May Recover Proven Loss
of Society Damages
Shawn Finley died from injuries sustained when a semitrailer
struck him.1 1 7 He was survived by his parents, two brothers, a
half-brother, and a half-sister.1 8 His father, as special administra-
tor of his estate, filed a wrongful death action." 9 The parties
agreed to a settlement in which the decedent's siblings were not
allowed to recover under the Wrongful Death Act. 20 The court
had appointed a guardian to represent the interests of the siblings
but had approved the settlement despite the guardian's objec-
tion.12' The appellate court affirmed in an unpublished order. 22
The supreme court granted the guardian's petition for leave to ap-
peal in order to decide whether siblings could recover loss of soci-
ety damages under the Wrongful Death Act. 123
The court began by noting that siblings could recover for pecuni-
ary injuries as next of kin under the Wrongful Death Act if the
decedent left no spouse or descendants.' 24 Next, the court re-
112. Id. at 514 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
113. Id. (Miller, C.J., concurring).
114. Id. at 514-15 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
115. Id. at 514 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
116. 601 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. 1992).
117. Id. at 699.
118. Id. at 699-700.
119. Id. at 700.
120. Id.
121. Finley, 601 N.E.2d at 700.
122. In re Estate of Finley, 209 Ill. App. 3d 1112 (1991), rev'd, 601 N.E.2d 699 (Il.
1992).
123. In re Estate of Finley, 580 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. 1991).
124. Finley, 601 N.E.2d at 701.
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viewed the series of decisions in which it had held that loss of soci-
ety could be considered a pecuniary injury12 and noted that the
Wrongful Death Act did not distinguish between the types of dam-
ages available based on the category of next of kin. 126 Since the
Wrongful Death Act provides that next of kin can recover for pe-
cuniary injuries, the court held that in a wrongful death action,
siblings who are next of kin can recover proven loss of society
damages. 127
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether a presumption of
damages applied. 128 The court first acknowledged that the parent-
child and spousal relationships differ from the relationship between
siblings in both emotional and economic interdependence. 2 9 It
found this difference sufficient to result in a different application of
the presumption, although the different nature of the relationship
would not preclude recovery of proven damages. 3 ° The court then
remanded the action for possible reopening of the settlement
should the guardian be able prove such damages. 131
IV. ANALYSIS
Following these decisions, the issue arises about whether judicial
construction of the phrase pecuniary injuries to include loss of soci-
ety damages in some settings requires that these damages be avail-
able in all wrongful death actions. In his concurring opinion in
Seef, Chief Justice Miller correctly noted that if the Elliott court
had intended to make loss of society damages available as pecuni-
ary injuries in every wrongful death action, then the Bullard court
would not have had to decide the issue of whether parents could
recover such damages for the death of a minor child. 32 An intent
in Elliott to extend loss of society damages to all wrongful death
actions would also have been inconsistent with the Bullard court's
refusal to extend its holding to a child having reached majority 33
and with the Seef court's failure to provide guidance on whether
fetal viability is necessary to recover. 134 Although it has yet to
125. Id. at 701-02.
126. Id. at 702.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Finley, 601 N.E.2d at 702.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 703.
132. Seef, 583 N.E.2d at 512 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
133. Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (Ill. 1984).
134. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
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deny a plaintiff in a wrongful death action the opportunity to prove
loss of society damages, the supreme court has refused to extend
the presumption to all wrongful death actions, suggesting that lim-
its to recovery exist and are being approached.
A. Equitable Considerations
The argument that it is inequitable to consider loss of society as
a pecuniary injury in one setting but not in another has been per-
suasive in decisions expanding the availability of these damages. , 35
Future plaintiffs can be expected to forward this argument in new
settings. Plaintiffs who believe they are entitled to damages will
inevitably seek to recover them,13 6 and courts will eventually be
asked to decide whether these damages are available to parents of a
nonviable stillborn fetus or to siblings of an unborn decedent. Par-
ents seeking loss of society damages for the death of a nonviable
fetus could argue that it would be inequitable to allow recovery
after but not before viability. Similarly, siblings of an unborn dece-
dent could note the inequity of allowing proven damages for a
death occurring shortly after but not for one occurring shortly
before birth. 37 Extending this rationale to its logical conclusion
would permit loss of society damages in all wrongful death actions.
However, despite numerous opportunities, the supreme court has
not taken this step. If future courts deny these damages, their deci-
sions will undoubtedly hinge on an analysis of the loss for which
these damages compensate.
B. What Is "'Loss of Society"?
The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted loss of society to be
deprivation of the companionship, guidance, advice, love, and af-
135. Finley, 601 N.E.2d at 702 (stating that "this court ... recognize[s] the 'special
relationship between spouses, and between parent and child,' [and] we reject the sugges-
tion that there can be no 'special relationship' between siblings"); Seef, 583 N.E.2d at 512
(stating that "logic requires that if we allow loss of society damages for infants, that we
allow such damages where the nearly full-term child dies before birth"); Ballweg, 499
N.E.2d at 1379 (stating that "[w]e fail to see how a presumption of loss of society sud-
denly disappears upon a child's 18th birthday").
136. See Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1987) (refusing to extend loss of society damages available under Bullard to the
owner-pet relationship, leaving damages to be determined by the law relating to loss of
personal property of sentimental value).
137. In the Seer majority opinion, substitution of the word "sibling" for "parent" and
appropriate changes in the case citations would lead to this conclusion. See See, 583
N.E.2d at 511-12.
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fection of the deceased. 138 As a pecuniary loss in wrongful death
actions, loss of society encompasses damages for many facets of
family relationships.' 39 The majority opinion in Seef failed to dis-
cuss the nature of these damages, leaving unresolved the question
of whether they compensate for the destruction of the existing soci-
ety with the decedent' 4° or the loss of future society.' This dis-
tinction is obviously important when compensating for the loss of
society of a stillborn. 142
Significant problems exist with both approaches in this setting.
For example, if only the existing relationship mattered, the fact
that the fetus had suffered from defects precluding survival after
birth would not be relevant. 143 Sometimes, prenatal "society" can
be detrimental to maternal health.'" Under this approach, a
mother who had nurtured herself through a difficult pregnancy
would presumably recover less than a mother who had had no
problems. Finally, not only is the nature of the existing maternal-
fetal relationship difficult to evaluate, but it changes and eventually
terminates as the natural consequence of a normal pregnancy.
Awarding damages based on the loss of prospective society also
poses difficulties. Theoretically, if a couple was unaware of an
early pregnancy until they lost the child, they could still recover
for the loss of a lifetime of the child's society. The society that a
child would have provided during its life would be no different had
it been lost in the first trimester of pregnancy or the last. Under
this scheme of compensation, the child's gender, or the fact it had
been fathered by the Nobel sperm bank,145 would be more impor-
138. See Finley, 601 N.E.2d at 702; Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1232 (citing Hall v. Gil-
lins, 147 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ill. 1958)).
139. Seef, 583 N.E.2d at 511; Finley, 601 N.E.2d at 702.
140. Seef, 562 N.E.2d at 612.
141. See, 583 N.E.2d at 514 (Miller, C.J., concurring); Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 1170.
142. The example of the surrogate mother illustrates this distinction. For a fee, the
surrogate contracts to carry the child of a couple who would otherwise be unable to have
children. At birth, the surrogate turns the child over to the couple. Prior to birth, the
surrogate is the beneficiary of the child's existing "society," with the parents having only
an expectation of future (prospective) society. For a review of the legal issues that have
arisen from such arrangements, see Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and
the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1546-51 (1990).
143. See supra note 78.
144. See generally JACK A. PRITCHARD, M.D., ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS
(1985). Examples would include morning sickness, id. at 260-61, hyperemesis
gravidarum, id. at 613, gestational diabetes, id. at 598-604, and preeclampsia, id. at 540-
41.
145. For an account of some of the remarkable children who have been fathered by
this sperm bank, see Pascale Le Draoulec, The Children of the Nobel Sperm Bank, 69
MED. ECON. No.4, at 106 (Feb. 17, 1992).
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tant than the fact that the couple had spent years trying to con-
ceive. Inner-city parents might recover less than suburban parents
if statistics showed that their child would most likely have turned
to drugs and crime. The couple's ability to have another child
would not seem relevant to the society that the lost child would
have provided them.
Considering the problems of the loss of society approach in com-
pensating the parents of a stillborn, questions arise about whether
loss of society is actually the "pecuniary injury" for which these
damages are intended. Perhaps the Hunt court was correct in
maintaining that the award of such damages was not meant to
compensate for loss of society but rather for the couple's mental
anguish.146 Had it actually intended to compensate for mental
anguish, the Seef court would have provided much better guidance
to juries had it so held. Perhaps the court felt that compensating
for mental anguish could not be reconciled with the pecuniary inju-
ries constraint of the wrongful death statute, and could not be ac-
complished through another tort mechanism. 47 If this had been
the case, the apparent alternative would have been to leave the de-
cision to the legislature rather than employing convoluted reason-
ing to circumvent the statutory limitation.
146. Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1326. Loss of parent-child society and negligent infliction
of emotional distress have been considered together in discussions of compensating plain-
tiffs for intangible injuries. See John L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited. Toward a
Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 477, 479-80 (1984).
Factors such as the stage of the pregnancy, difficulty of conception, and ability to re-
place the child would be more relevant to the determination of the parents' mental
anguish than to the nature of the society that the child would have provided.
147. The plaintiff in Seef had originally sought damages for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Seef, 562 N.E.2d at 607. This claim was denied since the mother did
not plead that she feared for her own safety within a zone of danger. Id. at 609; see also
Hunt, 510 N.E.2d at 1327 (dismissing a complaint alleging negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, since the plaintiff did not allege that she feared for her own safety within
the zone of danger).
In DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 493 (N.C. 1987), the North Carolina
Supreme Court recognized that a stillborn was a person under its wrongful death statute.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984). Despite the fact that the statute explicitly provided
for loss of society damages, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4)(c) (1984), the court re-
fused to award them, stating:
When a child is stillborn we simply cannot know anything about its personality
and other traits relevant to what kind of companion it might have been and
what kind of services it might have provided. An award of damages covering
these kinds of losses would necessarily be based on speculation rather than
reason.
Id. at 494. However, the court did note that recovery for the mother's mental anguish at
having lost her child would be available in the mother's own personal injury action. Id.
at 494 n.3.
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C. Effect of the Presumption
The term presumption has been defined as "an inference which
common sense draws from the known course of events." 48 For the
loss of a child, the presumption eliminates the difficulties inherent
in proving the traditional pecuniary injuries of lost wages and serv-
ices, allowing the jury to estimate them on the basis of its knowl-
edge and experience. 49  Once Bullard made loss of society
damages available, the ease of proving these losses reduced the sig-
nificance of the presumption. 5 ° However, Seef has restored the
pre-Bullard importance of the presumption by extending it from a
relationship whose pecuniary value is difficult to estimate to a rela-
tionship whose existence is difficult to determine.' 5'
The Seef court apparently intended the presumption to enable
parents to recover losses that were difficult to determine because of
the timing of the defendant's wrongful act.'52 This would be con-
sistent with the original purpose of the presumption: to benefit par-
ents who would otherwise have difficulty proving traditional
pecuniary injuries.' 53 Since it is equally difficult to calculate the
loss of the existing society and the prospective society with an un-
born child, the rationale behind the presumption is consistent with
either view of the nature of loss of society damages. In extending
the presumption, the Seef majority offered little insight into its rea-
soning, noting only the inequity of allowing the presumption for
the loss of a newborn child but not for an unborn one. 54
In Finley, the court held that the existence of the presumption
depends on the nature of the relationship.'55 By denying a pre-
sumption of loss of society to a decedent's siblings, the court fol-
lowed the rule that a sibling is only entitled to proven pecuniary
damages. 15 6 When it noted the differing emotional and economic
interdependence between parent and child, spouses, and siblings,
148. See Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing McElroy v. Force, 232 N.E.2d 708 (Ill.
1967)).
149. City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349, 360 (1857).
150. See Schmidt, supra note 34, at 329-32 (noting that loss of society could be
proven by simply calling the surviving next of kin and asking him to chronicle his rela-
tionship with the decedent).
151. See Seef, 562 N.E.2d at 612 (noting that determining the existence and extent of
this relationship requires medical expertise).
152. Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ill. 1991) (Miller, C.J., concurring).
153. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text; see also Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at
1233.
154. Seef, 583 N.E.2d at 512.
155. Finley, 601 N.E.2d at 702.
156. Id.
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the Finley court may have implicitly recognized the legal duties
and obligations inherent in these relationships. 5 7 In the absence of
these parent-child or spousal duties and obligations, a sibling must
prove the nature of his society with the decedent in order to re-
cover. By analogy, the absence of a parental duty to a nonviable
fetus' 58 would argue against applying the presumption to this
setting.
D. Unresolved Issues
The approach taken in Seef and Finley assures that courts will
revisit the issue of loss of society damages in other settings. Parties
will undoubtedly ask for jury instructions reflecting their percep-
tion of these damages, generating appeals that ask courts to better
define the nature of the damages. The decision of whether the sib-
ling of an unborn decedent is entitled to prove loss of society dam-
ages will hinge on whether these damages compensate for loss of
existing society or of prospective society. In the absence of an ex-
isting relationship, the plaintiff could only attempt to prove the so-
ciety that the unborn sibling would have provided. Were the
plaintiff allowed to make such attempts, a prospective view of loss
of society would be implicit in the decision.
An issue left unresolved by Seef is whether a presumption of
these damages also applies to the nonviable fetus,'59 although the
Seef court did use language suggesting a viability requirement.
While acknowledging that the Wrongful Death Act recognized the
fetus as a "person," the Seer majority found no reason to deny
similar recovery for the death of a "viable" fetus."6 It later noted
157. See Sheahan, 496 N.E.2d at 1181 (noting the obligations of parents to their
children and children to their parents). This would also be consistent with limiting re-
covery of loss of consortium damages for nonfatal injuries to plaintiffs who have incurred
the obligations of a valid marriage. See supra note 27.
158. The Illinois Wrongful Death Act explicitly provides an exclusion for lawful
abortion: "There shall be no cause of action against a physician or a medical institution
for the wrongful death of a fetus caused by an abortion where the abortion was permitted
by law and the requisite consent was lawfully given." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2.2
(1991).
This portion of the Act was construed in Light v. Proctor Community Hosp., 538
N.E.2d 828, 829 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1989), a wrongful death action in which a woman
underwent an abortion after a radiologist negligently exposed the fetus to radiation. Id.
Although the radiologist had originally placed the fetus at risk, the actual cause of death
was the abortion, for which no wrongful death action could lie. Id. at 830.
159. Smith established this as precedent in the First District. 560 N.E.2d at 1173
(holding that the amended Wrongful Death Act had eliminated the need for the plaintiff
to prove fetal viability). The Seef court did not have to address the viability issue. 583
N.E.2d at 511 (fetus described as being 38 weeks old and viable).
160. Seer, 583 N.E.2d at 511.
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that it would be illogical to allow loss of society damages for in-
fants but deny them when the "nearly full-term child" dies before
birth.1 6 ' In both the majority and concurring opinions, the court
held that a rebuttable presumption of lost society exists for the
wrongful death of a "stillborn child."1 62 The court did not use the
term unborn fetus. If stillborn child indicates that the death oc-
curred near term, this distinction could imply a viability require-
ment. If asked whether Seef applies before fetal viability, the
court's decision will establish whether the presumption arises from
the biological relationship between the plaintiffs and decedent or
from the legal duties and obligations between parent and child,
which may not exist before viability. 63
E. Impact
These decisions increase the number of potential plaintiffs and
the damages available to them in wrongful death actions. Being
speculative, damages for the lost society of an unborn child are
difficult to estimate with any certainty. Not only does the potential
to recover greater damages6M create a financial incentive to sue,
but the speculative nature of the damages makes it difficult for de-
fendants to estimate liability exposure in settlement negotiations.
This could result in more actions being filed and also in a greater
percentage of them going to trial. If siblings of an unborn decedent
are allowed to recover, this problem could be compounded. Unlike
Seef, however, Finley requires that damages be proven, thus pro-
viding some guidance for defendants trying to estimate liability
exposure.
Since wrongful death claims based on stillbirths are commonly
made against obstetricians, 65 obstetricians will be particularly af-
fected by the Seef decision. If liability is further expanded to in-
161. Id. at 512.
162. Id. at 512, 515.
163. See supra note 158.
164. Citing the See" decision, an Illinois appellate court sustained a jury award for
$400,000 in a wrongful death action based on a stillborn fetus. Riley v. Koneru, 593
N.E.2d 788, 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1992) (failing to mention viability). The court
noted the standard by which an appellate court determines whether a jury's award is
excessive:
A reviewing court will not disturb a jury's award of damages unless it is obvi-
ously the result of passion or prejudice. Furthermore, an award is not excessive
unless it falls outside the necessary limits of fair and reasonable compensation
or it shocks the judicial conscience.
Id. at 790-91 (citations omitted).
165. Obstetrical malpractice cases cited in this Comment include: Seef v. Sutkus, 583
N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1991); Smith v. Mercy Hosp. and Medical Ctr, 560 N.E.2d 1164 (Ill.
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clude siblings of the stillborn or to parents of a nonviable fetus,
then liability exposure would increase in an already high-risk medi-
cal specialty. Malpractice insurers would presumably cover this
exposure by raising premiums, but these costs would then be
passed on to patients. Higher premiums coupled with physician
aversion to litigation could decrease the availability of obstetrical
services. If loss of society damages were made available for the
destruction of frozen embryos, 16 6 the storage of embryos would be-
come an extremely high-risk activity and this could have a chilling
effect on advanced reproductive technology.
The brunt of Seef will ultimately be borne by juries, who will be
asked to place a cash value on the lost society of a stillborn. Case
law provides conflicting guidance, with the decisions differing on
the type of loss for which loss of society damages compensate.
Awards will undoubtedly be inconsistent and unpredictable until
further judicial or legislative guidance is provided.
V. PROPOSAL
Rather than asking the jury to make the difficult determination
of the value of a relationship that was lost before it came into be-
ing, it could instead be asked to determine the loss of the invest-
ment the parents had made in the hope of acquiring this "society."
In purely economic terms, children are generally a liability, and
parents have children with other considerations in mind. During
the pregnancy, the parents make an investment with the expecta-
tion of intangible future benefits (society) and the uncertain pros-
pect of eventual monetary benefits. 67 As a child becomes older,
both the society exchanged with its parents and its monetary con-
tributions become more ascertainable as the return on the parents'
investment is realized.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990); Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1987);
Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982).
166. The Wrongful Death Act provides for a cause of action despite "the state of
gestation or development." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2.2 (1991) (emphasis added).
Gestation is defined as "the carrying of young in the uterus." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 515 (1987). A construction of the phrase or development to
include extrauterine embryos could have this effect.
167. The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged this in extending the presumption of
loss of society injuries to an adult child in Ballweg, 499 N.E.2d 1373, in which it stated:
The return on parents' investment in their children is very real, even though it
may not be in the form of money. When children are wrongfully killed, the
parents' investment of money and in affection, guidance, security and love is
destroyed. Society recognizes the destruction of that value, whether the child is
a minor or an adult.
Id. at 1379.
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Compensating parents for the investment they had made in a
pregnancy whose purpose had been defeated by the tortfeasor
would be particularly appropriate in the early stages of a preg-
nancy, when "actual" consortium is negligible and "prospective"
consortium is difficult to determine. 68  Here, the parents' actual
pecuniary loss is better reflected in the expenses and burdens in-
curred as a result of the pregnancy, including any difficulties exper-
ienced in conceiving the child. 169
Although it would be inappropriate to require a couple to miti-
gate damages by having another child, the parents' decision not to
have another child may suggest that they did not value the lost
child's prospective society more than the burdens of another preg-
nancy. Were the couple to have another child after recovering loss
of society damages, the recovery could be disproportionate to the
actual loss.'70
Awarding damages based on the parents' lost investment would
be more consistent with the original spirit of pecuniary injuries
under the Wrongful Death Act, and would be an alternative to
extending Seefs holding to the nonviable fetus. A couple's invest-
ment in the pregnancy would be subject to a more objective deter-
mination, with the potential benefit of more uniform and
predictable awards. From the perspective of the courts, this ap-
proach would have the added advantage of favoring settlement of
these actions rather than encouraging litigation over highly specu-
lative damages. The court may find it difficult to resist the tempta-
tion of further expanding the availability of loss of society
168. Complete restoration might not be possible if the couple could no longer have
children (i.e., if one spouse had been killed or rendered infertile). Examples would in-
clude a situation in which the mother lost both her unborn child and her spouse in an
accident or in which the injuries causing the loss of the unborn child also necessitated a
hysterectomy. However, in the first instance, she could recover for the lost consortium of
her spouse under the Wrongful Death Act, and in the second she could recover damages
in a negligence action for the injuries that resulted in her loss of fertility.
169. Damages could include pregnancy-related medical expenses, lost wages incident
to the pregnancy, and the cost of the infertility treatments that led to the pregnancy.
170. The loss of marital consortium is measured until the time of remarriage. See
Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland R.R. Co., 474 N.E.2d 458 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1985). There, the court observed:
So in the instant case, if loss of consortium is sought, it must be actual loss; that
is, loss up to the time of remarriage. It may be true, as plaintiff argues, that
consortium with the deceased spouse may have been of a different quality from
that with the present spouse, but such speculations could lead only to Aristoph-
anes' Nepheloccocygia.
Id. at 463; see also Dotson v. Sears Roebuck, & Co., 557 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Ill. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1990).
[Vol. 24
Consortium Before Birth
damages, 7 1 but it should carefully consider the implications of do-
ing so. The goals of tort law are compensatory, and damages dis-
proportionate to the injuries sustained appear to be punitive rather
than compensatory.
If courts followed an approach that considered the nature of the
actual relationship destroyed as well as the plaintiff's investment in
it, 172 siblings of an unborn decedent could not recover loss of soci-
ety damages. The sibling has incurred no legal obligations or du-
ties as a result of an unborn child's existence and has made no
investment in the pregnancy. Unlike the maternal-fetal relation-
ship, no actual relationship exists between a sibling and the unborn
child; and unlike the parents, the sibling is not responsible for the
unborn child's existence. Drawing a line at birth may result in
inequities, but a line must nevertheless be drawn. 3 The require-
ment that a sibling be an heir in existence at the time of the death
precludes recovery by siblings born thereafter. 174 Would it be fair
to deny recovery to a sibling born shortly after the wrongful death
but not to one born shortly before 7 5 when calculation of damages
in each case would be equally difficult? Should a defendant escape
liability because of the timing of his wrongful act? The application
of this reasoning to all settings leads to patently absurd results.
The parents of a nonviable fetus may not have assumed any legal
duties or obligations toward,'76 or established a demonstrable rela-
tionship with the fetus, but they have made an investment in the
171. The court would not be the first to permit recovery of loss of society for the
death of an unborn sibling. See In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d
1230, 1236 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Louisiana law, a federal court held that such dam-
ages are permissible).
172. The latter could include both actual expenses and legal obligations incurred as
part of the relationship.
173. Some argue that birth is a better place to draw the line, even in the parent-child
setting. It is a definite, precise, and observable occurrence, unlike viability, which is un-
certain, indefinite, and unpredictable as the state of technology advances. See Chrisafoge-
orgis, 304 N.E.2d at 92 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
174. In Finley, 699 N.E.2d at 701, the court stated: "the phrase 'next of kin,' for
purposes of the Wrongful Death Act, are those blood relatives of decedent in existence at
decedent's death who would take decedent's property if decedent had died intestate." See
also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110'/2, para. 2-3 (1991) (providing that a posthumous child of a
decedent may inherit as if the child had been born in the decedent's lifetime; no similar
provision is made for a decedent's other descendants or siblings).
175. Courts have even found defendants liable for injuries caused by torts occurring
before the plaintiff's conception. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (I11.
1977) (holding a physician liable for negligence occurring prior to plaintiff's conception,
where a transfusion of incompatible blood to the mother resulted in development of ma-
ternal antibodies causing injury to the subsequently conceived child).
176. See supra note 157.
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pregnancy and have been responsible for the relationship's exist-
ence. Presumably, the parents' investment in the pregnancy would
be easy to establish. However, if the plaintiffs believed that de-
struction of the maternal-fetal relationship before viability also re-
sulted in lost society, it would be reasonable to require them to
prove the nature of the relationship destroyed and its value rather
than allowing them to rely on a presumption of damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
By expanding the presumption of loss of society damages to a
wrongful death action based on the loss of a viable fetus, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court has greatly expanded the potential damages
available to plaintiffs. Its failure to provide guidance on the nature
of loss of society damages compounds the already high potential
for jury confusion and inconsistent verdicts. Although the Finley
court increased the number of potential plaintiffs, its requirement
that damages be proven should reduce the potential for such
problems in wrongful death actions brought by siblings.
Neither the amended Wrongful Death Act nor common sense
mandates expanding the availability of loss of society damages to
siblings of an unborn decedent or expanding the presumption to
parents losing a nonviable fetus. Such an expansion would be in-
consistent with the pecuniary damages limitation of the Illinois
wrongful death statute, and it could actually obscure factors that
should more appropriately be considered.
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